COMMENTS

Celebrity Names as Web Site Addresses: Extending the
Domain of Publicity Rights to the Internet
DeborahJ. Ezert
Imagine that you are a celebrity, and when you type your name in
as a domain name, www.yourname.com, you are brought to a web site
that you neither created nor sanctioned. The site could be soliciting
contributions for a charity you have never heard of, contain pornographic images, or even be auctioning off your name as a domain
name while using the web site to advertise some other business. Each
of these scenarios has occurred and has raised the ire of many celebrities attempting to protect one of the most valuable commodities that
they control: the use of their names.
Barry Diller, head of USA Networks, Inc., has filed one of the
first lawsuits claiming illegal use of a celebrity name as a domain
name and demanding compensation for the unjust enrichment enjoyed by the men who attempted to sell his name to the highest bidder. Diller's suit relies on the doctrine of publicity rights and attempts
to extend the scope of this well established theory of recovery to the
Internet.' Other celebrities have similarly fallen victim to such opportunistic behavior. Household names like Brad Pitt, Madonna, and
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1 Barry DUller and his media company, USA Networks, Inc., initiated a suit on June 23,
1999, against three men who allegedly tried to sell Diller's name as a domain name for $10 million. Diller filed in New York Supreme Court, relying on New York's statutory publicity rights,
among other claims. The three men, doing business as Thoughts and Cybermultimedia Inc., registered "barrydiller.com" as a domain name earlier that year without Diller's permission and offered it to web site visitors for $10 million. The suit also claims the web site,
www.cybermultimedia.com, used Diller's picture and the USA Networks trademark without his
permission. Bloomberg, Barry Diller Sues Men Selling His Name, NY Post 34 (June 24, 1999);
Troy Patterson and Will Lee, Monitor,Entertainment Weekly 12 (July 9,1999).
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John Tesh have recently become involved in disputes, attempting to
gain control over web sites that use their names as domain names.
At present, the published judicial decisions on domain name disputes generally involve business conflicts over the use of registered
marks, and courts apply the law of trademark to govern the rights at
issue. Trademark law regulates the use of registered marks, not unregistered names such as celebrity names. Thus, trademark law cannot be
applied to these more recent disputes involving famous names, creating a hole in the fabric of the law.
On the other hand, the right of publicity allows celebrities and
other well known public figures to control the commercial exploitation of their identities. It recognizes the inherent economic value in a
celebrity name. The doctrine grants an individual the ability to prevent
others from using his name when there is something so unique about
the name that unauthorized use would create confusion as to what he
has chosen to sponsor or to endorse. But because publicity rights laws
are either established through state legislation or common law, and
the use of a domain name on the Internet transcends state boundaries,
it is not clear which law to apply. The Internet thus presents the
unique and unsettled question of what rights and protections are
available to a person's name, specifically when it is used as a domain
name or "web address."
This Comment argues that courts should apply publicity rights
law to celebrity names used as domain names. Part I traces the origins
of publicity rights law and examines its development as an economic
doctrine, establishing when the right of publicity exists, which states
uphold this right, and to whom it applies. Part II considers the issues
surrounding the extension of publicity rights to domain name disputes,
and discusses both the policy rationales for this extension as well as
the obstacles to applying the doctrine to these disputes. Part III argues
that courts should apply publicity rights law to domain name disputes
and demonstrates the feasibility of this proposal by elucidating characteristics, unique to domain names and publicity rights, that help
overcome the obstacles. This Comment concludes that the application
of publicity rights law to the Internet is a judicially practicable and desirable way to resolve celebrity domain name disputes.

2
Zack Stentz, Download by Law, Entertainment Weekly 81 (Feb 11, 2000); Steve Knopper, Pay To.Com: Bands Are Finding They Aren't Masters of Their Own Domains,Spin 60 (May
2000).
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I. THE PUBLICITY RIGHTS DoCTRINE: COMMODIFYING THE
CELEBRITY PERSONA

The right of publicity exists as a statutory right in some states, a
common law right in others,. and not at all in a number of states.! The

3
Seventeen states have enacted right of publicity statutes or right of privacy statutes that
encompass a right of publicity. Cal Civ Code §§ 3344-3344.1 (West 1997 & Supp 2000); Fla Stat
Ann § 540.08 (West 1997 & Supp 2000); 765 ILCS 1075/1 et seq (1999); Ind Code Ann §§ 32-131-1 to -20 (Burns 1999); Michie's Ky Rev Stat § 391.170 (Lexis 1999); Mass Ann Laws ch 214,
§ 3A (Lexis 1999); Neb Rev Stat § 20-202 (1997); Nev Rev Stat §§ 597.770-597.810 (1997); 1992
& Supp 1999 NY Civ Rights Law §§ 50-51; 1996 NY Gen Bus Laws § 397; 12 Okla Stat Ann
§§ 1448-49 (West 1993 & Supp 1999); 21 Okla Stat Ann §§ 839.1-839.3 (West 1983 & Supp
1999); RI Gen Laws §§ 9-1-28 to -28.1 (1997); Tenn Code Ann §§ 47-25-1101 to -1108 (1995); Tex
Property Code Ann §§ 26.001-26.015 (Vernon 2000); Utah Code Ann §§ 45-3-1 to -6 (1998 &
Supp 1999) (limiting protection to false endorsements in advertising), Utah Code Ann § 76-9-407
(Lexis 1999) (establishing criminal penalty for similar offense); Va Code §§ 8.01-40, 18.2-216.1
(1996); Wash Rev Code Ann § 63.60.010 et seq (West Supp 1999); Wis Stat Ann § 895.50 (West
1997).
Some of these states also recognize a common law right of publicity. See Slivinsky v WatkinsJohnson Co,221 Cal App 3d 799,207 Cal Rptr 585,589 (1990); Zim v Western Publishing Co, 573
F2d 1318, 1327-29 (5th Cir 1978) (Florida); Douglass v Hustler Magazin4 Inc, 769 F2d 1128,
1138-39 (7th Cir 1985) (Illinois); Foster-MilburnCo v Chinn,134 Ky 424,120 SW 364,366 (1909);
Carson v National Bank of Commerce, 501 F2d 1082,1084-85 (8th Cir 1974) (Nebraska); People
for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v Berosini, Ltd, 111 Nev 615,895 P2d 1269,1283-85 (1995);
Stephano v News Group PublicationsInc, 64 NY2d 174,474 NE2d 580,584 (1984); McCormack v
Oklahoma Publishing Co, 1980 Okla 98,613 P2d 737,739; Elvis Presley InternationalMemorial
Fund v Crowell, 733 SW2d 89, 97-99 (Tenn App 1987); National Bank of Commerce v Shaklee
Corp, 503 F Supp 533, 539-41 (W D Tex 1980); Cox v Hatch, 761 P2d 556, 562-65 (Utah 1988);
Hirsch v S.C Johnson & Sons; Inc, 90 Wis 2d 379,280 NW2d 129,132-33 (1979).
4
Twenty-four states recognize only a common law right of publicity or a common law
right of privacy that encompasses a right of publicity. See Allison v Vintage Sports Plaques,136
F3d 1443, 1447 (11th Cir 1998) (Alabama); Olan Mills; Inc v Dodd, 234 Ark 495,353 SW2d 22,
23-24 (1962); Venturi v Savitt,Inc,191 Conn 588,468 A2d 933,934 (1983); Slibeck v Union Oil Co
of California,1986 Del Super LEXIS 1376, *3-5; Vassiliades v Garfinckel's Brooks Brothers,492
A2d 580,586-89 (DC 1985); Martin Luther King, Jr.Centerfor Social Change Inc v American
HeritageProducts; Inc, 250 Ga 135,296 SE2d 697,697-700 (1982); Fergerstrom v Hawaiian Ocean
View Estates,Inc, 50 Hawaii 374,441 P2d 141,144 (1968); Johnson v Boeing Airplane Co, 175 Kan
275,262 P2d 808,812 (1953); Prudhomme v Proctor& Gamble Co, 800 F Supp 390,395 (E D La
1992); Nelson v Times, 373 A2d 1221,1223-24 (Me 1977); Lawrence v A.S. Abell Co, 299 Md 697,
475 A2d 448, 449-53 (1984); Carson v Here's Johnny Portable Toilets; Inc, 698 F2d 831, 834-36
(6th Cir 1983) (Michigan); Lake v Wal-Mart Stores Inc, 582 NW2d 231, 233-35 (Minn 1998);
Candebat v Flanagan,487 S2d 207, 209-12 (Miss 1986); Haith v Model Cities Health Corp, 704
SW2d 684,687-88 (Mo App 1986); Gilham v Burlington Northern,Inc, 514 F2d 660,662-63 (9th
Cir 1975) (Montana); Estate ofPresley v Russen, 513 F Supp 1339,1353-55 (D NJ 1981); Benally
v Hundred Arrows Press,Inc, 614 F Supp 969 (D NM 1985); Flake v Greensboro News Co, 212
NC 780,195 SE 55,63 (1938); Reeves v United Artists Corp, 765 F2d 79,80 (6th Cir 1985) (Ohio);
Martinez v Democrat-HeraldPublishingCo, 64 Or App 690,669 P2d 818,820 (1983); Gee v CBS,
Inc, 471 F Supp 600,661-62 (E D Pa 1979), affd, 612 F2d 572 (3d Cir 1979); Staruski v Continental Tel Co, 154 Vt 568,581 A2d 266,268-69 (1990); Crump v Beckley Newspapers; Inc, 173 W Va
699,320 SE2d 70,81-89 (1984).
5
Those states that currently recognize neither a statutory right of publicity nor a common
law right include Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Iowa, New Hampshire, North Dakota, South Carolina, South Dakota, and Wyoming.
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right of publicity6 focuses specifically on the economic interests inherent in privacy rights. In other words, the publicity rights doctrine protects the right7 of an individual to control the commercial exploitation
of his identity.
A. The Development of the Publicity Rights Doctrine
State courts started to view celebrity names as a property interest
at the turn of the twentieth century. The process began with a 1903
New York statute that prohibited the use of a living person's name,
portrait, or picture for "advertising purposes" or for "purposes of
trade." The New York legislature enacted the statute to counter the
Court of Appeals' decision in Roberson v Rochester Folding Box Co,9
which permitted the unauthorized use of a minor's photograph on a
poster. Two years later, in Pavesich v New England Life Insurance Co,"
the Georgia Supreme Court held that the unauthorized use of a person's photograph in a testimonial advertisement was actionable as an
1
invasion of privacy."
The plaintiffs in Roberson and Pavesich asserted claims that logically fit within the basic conception of privacy as the right to be let
alone. In both cases, unknown people had been exposed to vast and
unwanted publicity. Thus, courts could plausibly assimilate their claims
of embarrassment or emotional distress within an emerging privacy
rights framework.
Other courts soon began to apply this right to individuals who did
not so easily fit into the traditional privacy rights mold. A New Jersey
court, for example, explained its decision to enjoin the unauthorized
use of Thomas Edison's name and picture on a medicine label utilizing
the language of property:
6
Judge Jerome Frank first coined the term "right of publicity." Haelan Laboratories Inc v
Topps Chewing Gum, Inc, 202 F2d 866,868 (2d Cir 1953). It has been classified as a subset of one
of the four distinct torts that generally compose the common law right of privacy: (1) intrusion
upon a person's seclusion; (2) public disclosures of embarrassing private facts; (3) publicity that
places a person in a false light; and (4) commercial misappropriation of a person's identity. See J.
Thomas McCarthy, The Rights ofPublicity and Privacy § 1.5 at 1-18 to -26 (West 1996); Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 652A-6521 (1977).
7
See, for example, Zacchini v Scripps-HowardBroadcasting Co, 433 US 562,569 (1977);
Estate of Presley, 513 F Supp at 1353. For a comprehensive review of publicity rights law, see
McCarthy, The Rights of Publicityand Privacy (cited in note 6).
8 1903 NY Laws ch 132, § 1, codified as amended at NY Civ Rights Law §§ 50-51
(McKinney 1999).
9 171 NY 538,64 NE 442,447 (1902) (holding that there is no common law right of privacy
in a case where a minor, whose photograph had been used without her consent on a widely distributed advertising poster, sued for protection of her image).
10 122 Ga 190,50 SE 68 (1905).
11 Id at 81. The plaintiff was a relatively unknown artist whose photograph was used without permission in a testimonial advertisement for life insurance.
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If a man's name be his own property, as no less an authority than
the United States Supreme Court says, it is difficult to understand why the peculiar cast of one's features is not also one's
property, and why its pecuniary value, if it has one, does not belong to its owner rather than to the person seeking to make an
unauthorized use of it. 2
This opinion contains one of the earliest judicial espousals of the view
that unauthorized commercial appropriation of a person's identity infringes upon an economic interest. The New Jersey court regarded
Edison's persona as a commodity that he controlled. The unauthorized use of Edison's persona damaged
3 him by robbing him of the opportunity to market that commodity.'
The early years of the twentieth century saw motion pictures and
radio explode in popularity, and Hollywood quickly recognized the
substantial economic value of celebrity personas. 1 By the 1930s, it was
clear that if a celebrity only had a defensive right of privacy available
to protect and to recover against unauthorized commercial uses of his
identity after the injury had occurred, he would not be able to maximize the benefit from the publicity value of his name and likeness.
Under traditional privacy law, once a celebrity chose to avail himself
of the spotlight of fame, he was afforded a lower level of protection
than an average citizen. Therefore, celebrity plaintiffs attempted to
advance a theory of a property interest in one's name akin to the one
supported in the Edison case.
In 1935, famous baseball players made a high-profile attempt to
persuade the Fifth Circuit to accept this theory but were ultimately
unsuccessful when the court rejected the theory in Hanna Manufacturing Co v Hillerich & Bradsby Co." As Hanna demonstrated, celeb12 Edison v Edison Polyform and ManufacturingCo,73 NJ Eq 136,67 A 392,394 (NJ 1907)
(citation omitted).
13 Id at 394 (describing identity as property). See also Michael Madow, Private Ownership
of Public Image PopularCulture and Publicity Rights, 81 Cal L Rev 125,156 (1993) (identifying
the Edison opinion as one of the "earliest judicial statements [ ] that the interest infringed by
unauthorized commercial appropriation of a publicfigure is economic").
14 Madow, 81 Cal L Rev at 160-64 (cited in note 13) (describing how the advent of movies
and radio allowed fame to be based on image rather than accomplishment).
15 78 F2d 763 (5th Cir 1935). In Hanna,the plaintiff ("Hillerich") had contracted with certain famous baseball players for the exclusive right to use their names, autographs, and photographs in connection with the sale and advertising of baseball bats. Hanna, a competing manufacturer, had no agreements with the players, yet copied Hillerich's product to the detail of stamping the surnames of the players on their bats. The Fifth Circuit rejected Hillerich's claim of property rights in the names of the players, stating that whether the rights of the players to prevent
the unauthorized use of their names was a "personal" or a "property" right did not much matter,
for the right was "not vendible in gross so as to pass from purchaser to purchaser unconnected
with any trade or business" Id at 766. The court balked at the idea of rewarding celebrity: "Fame
is not merchandise. It would help neither sportsmanship nor business to uphold the sale of a famous name to the highest bidder as property." Id.
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rities could not rely on traditional privacy tort claims, given that movie
stars and professional athletes had chosen to live in the public eye.
They could not claim that being placed in the limelight caused emotional distress without seeming disingenuous and unconvincing. On
the other hand, the argument that the uncompensated use of a celebrity's name or likeness was actionable did follow logically from celebrity status." Thus, celebrities needed something more than the existing
right to privacy. They needed a new right that would protect against
the unauthorized use of their name and likeness-the right of publicity.
In 1953, the Second Circuit took the lead and decisively recognized the right of publicity as an economic conception. In Haelan
Laboratories,Inc v Topps Chewing Gum, Inc,17 the plaintiff, a chewing
gum manufacturer, had contracted with certain well known baseball
players for the exclusive right to use their photographs in selling its
products. Subsequently, an independent party, Russell Publishing
Company, which knew about Haelan's contracts, acquired similar
grants from those same players. Russell assigned its rights to the defendant Topps, a competing chewing gum manufacturer, which then
used the players' photographs in marketing its product. In response,
Haelan sought an injunction on the ground that Topps's conduct violated its right of exclusive use. Topps asserted that the players possessed no legal interest in their photographs other than the right of
privacy, which was a personal right and thus not assignable to third
parties. '
The Second Circuit held for Haelan, stating frankly, "[In addition
to and independent of that right of privacy (which in New York derives from statute), a man has a right in the publicity value of his photograph, i.e., the right to grant the exclusive privilege of publishing his
picture."9 The court went on to state that this right could be licensed
or assigned, and that the licensee or assignee could enforce it against
third parties. The court defined the new right explicitly:
This right might be called a "right of publicity." For it is common
knowledge that many prominent persons (especially actors and
ball-players), far from having their feelings bruised through public exposure of their likenesses, would feel sorely deprived if they
no longer received money for authorizing advertisements, popularizing their countenances, displayed in newspapers, magazines,
busses, trains and subways. This right of publicity would usually
16 Madow, 81 Cal L Rev at 171-72 (cited in note 13).
17 202 F2d 866 (2d Cir 1953).
18 Id at 867.
19 Id at 868.
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yield them no money unless it could be made the subject of an
exclusive grant which barred any other advertiser from using
their pictures.'
The Second Circuit justified this new right solely on the ground
that celebrities would "feel sorely deprived" if they were denied profits they could earn from their images.' The court essentially transformed the celebrity personality into a commodity and allowed it to
be traded in the market like any other product. Thus, by giving celebrity names legal protection, courts facilitated their growing commercial use.
Although Haelan was the first notable case to provide for the
protection of celebrity names? other courts followed the Second Circuit's lead in upholding the protection of musicians' names2 and other
athletes' names.24 The right of publicity has since been expanded to
protect nicknames and former names. For example, one court permitted a former football star known as "Crazylegs" to protect the use of
that nickname. ZA court also found that the nickname "The Greatest"
identified Muhammud Ali and protected his right in its use. 6 Additionally, the court held basketball great Kareem Abdul-Jabaar not to
have abandoned his right to protect his birth name, Lew Alcindor, by
legally changing his name.
The 1970s and 1980s witnessed continued growth and expansion
of publicity rights in many states, with the real boom occurring after
the Supreme Court's first articulation of support for the right of publicity in Zacchini v Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co.2S In that case,
Zacchini, a self-described "human cannonball" performer, brought an
action against Scripps-Howard, a television broadcasting company, to
recover damages suffered when Scripps-Howard filmed Zacchini's entire performance against his wishes and broadcast the footage on a

Id.
Id. See also Madow, 81 Cal L Rev at 173 (cited in note 13) (criticizing the Haelan court's
failure to "explain why [celebrities' failure to profit from their images] should be cause for judicial concern").
22 Madow, 81 Cal L Rev at 172 (cited in note 13) (characterizing Haelan as a "decisive legal
breakthrough").
23 Winterland Concessionsv Creative Screen Designs Ltd, 210 USPQ 6 (N D I1 1980).
24 See Uhlaenderv Henricksen,316 F Supp 1277,1282 (D Minn 1970) (recognizing baseball
players' proprietary interest in their personalities); Palmerv Schonhorn Enterprises Inc, 96 NJ
Super 72,232 A2d 458,462 (1967) (holding that golfers have a proprietary interest in their names
and statistics despite purposeful public disclosure of such information).
25 Hirsch v S.C Johnson & Son, Inc, 90 Wis 2d 379,280 NW2d 129,137 (1979).
26 All v Playgirl,Inc, 447 F Supp 723 (S D NY 1978).
27 Abdul-Jabbarv General Motors Corp, 85 F3d 407 (9th Cir 1996) (refusing to recognize
plaintiff's abandonment of his former name as a defense).
28 433 US 562 (1977).
20

21
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news program.7 The Court rejected Scripps-Howard's First Amendment defense of newsworthiness, stating that "[t]he broadcast of a film
of petitioner's entire act poses a substantial threat to the economic
value of that performance,"" which "goes to the heart of petitioner's
ability to earn a living as an entertainer."" The Court wrote that "'the
rationale for (protecting the right of publicity) is the straightforward
one of preventing unjust enrichment by the theft of good will.""' After
this decision, the view that individuals possess legal control over identifiable uses of their images gained "widespread acceptance in state
law."" Thus, the Court completed the conversion of control over the
use of a celebrity's name into a property right.
B.

Applying the Publicity Rights Doctrine

In order to institute a cause of action based on the right of publicity, a plaintiff must generally demonstrate that he owns an enforceable right in the identity involved, and that the defendant has infringed upon that right in some way-usually by an unauthorized
commercial use of the identity." The basic elements of a publicity
rights claim include showing that the defendant: (1) used the plaintiff's
identity; (2) benefited from the use of the plaintiff's name or persona;
(3) was not authorized to use the name or persona; and (4) injured the
celebrity's value, commercial or otherwise. 5 Pivotal issues that affect
this analysis include whether the plaintiff can be identified from the
defendant's unauthorized use of some aspect of the plaintiff's persona,
whether the plaintiff is sufficiently well known to qualify for publicity
rights protection, and whether the defendant's use of the plaintiff's

Id at 563.
Id at 575.
31 Id at 576.
32 Id, quoting Harry Kalven, Privacy in Tort Law: Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 L
& Contemp Probs 326,331 (1966).
33 Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, We Are Symbols and Inhabit Symbols, So Should We Be
Paying Rent? Deconstructingthe Lanham Act and Rights ofPublicity,20 Colum-VLA J L & Arts
123,125-26 (1996).
34 See, for example, Cal Civ Code § 3344 (West 1997); NY Civ Rights Law §§ 50-51. For a
general discussion, see McCarthy, The Rights of Publicityand Privacy,§ 3.1 at 3-2 to -6 (cited in
note 6); Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 46 (1995) (stating that "one who appropriates the commercial value of a person's identity by using without consent the person's name,
likeness, or other indicia or identity for purposes of trade is subject to liability"); William Prosser,
Law of Torts § 117 at 804-07 (West 4th ed 1971); Bruce P. Keller and David H. Bernstein, The
Right of Publicity: Towards a FederalStatute? in 1 PLI's FourthAnnual Institutefor Intellectual
PropertyLaw 413,430-36 (Practising Law Institute Course Handbook Series G-532 1998).
35 Bruce P. Keller and Craig Bloom, The Right of Publicity Versus the FirstAmendment, 17
Commun Lawyer 3,3 (Summer 1999). See, for example, Eastwood v SuperiorCourt, 149 Cal App
3d 409,198 Cal Rptr 342,347 (1983).
29

30
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identity is sufficiently distinct, such that it evokes an association with
the plaintiff."
Since each state individually chooses whether to afford publicity
fights and how broadly to extend those fights, the amount of protection afforded to celebrities will vary. For example, although on their
face, New York and California's publicity rights laws are nearly identical, they are interpreted and applied quite differently!' New York's
right of publicity favors advertisers' freedom to use ideas and objects
in the public domain, while California law favors the interests of celebrities at the expense of both legal certainty and advertisers' freedom.Courts have tempered the right of publicity against intrusion
upon others' fundamental rights. Accordingly, publicity rights are curtailed so as not to interfere with First Amendment liberties." The protection available in the right of publicity is limited to those individuals
for whom there is something so unique about their name that its unauthorized use would create confusion as to what they have chosen to
sponsor or endorse. While use of a celebrity name for financial gain is
not protected, photographic images and material written on a celebrity for "newsworthy"
purposes may be protected under the First
41
Amendment.
Keller and Bernstein, The Right of Publicity at 433-34 (cited in note 34).
New York law provides that "[a]ny person whose name, portrait, picture or voice is used
within this state for advertising purposes or for the purposes of trade without [ ] written consent
... may maintain an equitable action in the supreme court of this state against the person, firm
or corporation so using his name, portrait, picture or voice, to prevent and restrain the use
thereof; and may also sue and recover damages for any injuries sustained by reason of such use'
NY Civ Rights Law § 51.
California law provides that "[a]ny person who knowingly uses another's name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness, in any manner, on or in products, merchandise, or goods, or for purposes of advertising or selling ... without such person's prior consent ... shall be liable for any
damages sustained by the person or persons injured as a result thereof" Cal Civ Code
§ 3344(a).
38 Paul Cirino, Note, Advertisers Celebrities,and Publicity Rights in New York and California,39 NY L Sch L Rev 763, 770 (1994) (concluding that California law, which favors celebrities,
is inferior to New York law, which favors advertisers).
39 See Peter L. Felcher and Edward L. Rubin, Privacy,Publicity,and the Portrayalof Real
People by the Media, 88 Yale L J 1577, 1584-85 (1979) (arguing that the First Amendment controls the scope of privacy rights); James M. Treece, Commercial Exploitation of Names; Likenesses, and PersonalHistories,51 Tex L Rev 637,668-71 (1973) (stating that when restricting advertising containing the name or likeness of an individual conflicts with the First Amendment,
courts "must balance the public interest ... against the individual's interest in controlling advertising uses of his personality"); Keller and Bloom, 17 Commun Lawyer at 3 (cited in note 35)
(noting the need for a First Amendment-publicity rights balance). See, for example, Cardtoons
L.C v Major League Baseball Players Association,95 F3d 959, 968-70 (10th Cir 1996) (finding
defendant's First Amendment right to free expression trumped players' publicity rights in claim
involving parody baseball trading cards).
40 See the articles cited in note 39.
41 See, for example, Montana v San Jose Mercury News Inc, 34 Cal App 4th 790, 40 Cal
36

37
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II. ISSUES SURROUNDING THE EXTENSION OF PUBLICITY RIGHTS
TO DOMAIN NAME DISPUTES
The proposal to broaden the application of publicity rights to
Internet domain names requires examining the policy rationales behind the publicity rights doctrine and its extension into other areas.
This Part explains that the publicity rights doctrine is firmly grounded
in economic, moral, and consumer protection theories and demonstrates why these rationales apply to the same (or an even greater) extent in the context of the Internet. Then, this Part discusses several obstacles to applying publicity rights doctrine to the Internet that complicate the analysis.
A. Policy Rationales behind the Extension of the Publicity
Rights Doctrine
There are a number of reasons why a court might extend the
publicity rights doctrine to the Internet. Courts created the doctrine to
protect the property rights of the famous to control the use of their
names and personas, and to prevent others from unjustly enriching
themselves through the exploitation of a celebrity name or likeness.
The policy arguments for the doctrine fall into three basic categories:
economic, consumer protection, and moral. If these arguments apply
equally to the Internet context, then there is good reason to afford the
same protection for publicity rights in domain name disputes.
1. Economic rationales for the doctrine.
The most familiar version of the economic argument asserts that
the right of publicity, like copyright law,provides incentives to stimulate creative exertion and achievement.42 The right of publicity is a tool
for ensuring that a desired number of celebrities are produced. We
choose to protect celebrities' rights to the commercial exploitation of
their personas in order to encourage others to attain, or at least not
discourage them from attaining, similar fame. It is not that the law
aims to cultivate fame as an end, but rather that it respects the value
society places on the achievement of fame from certain accomplishRptr 2d 639,794 (1995) (holding that Mercury News had a First Amendment right to reprint and
sell poster-size prints of professional football player Joe Montana that had previously appeared
in newspaper on grounds that posters "reported newsworthy events"). See also note 39.
42 See, for example, David E. Shipley, Publicity Never Dies; It Just Fades Away: The Right of
Publicity and FederalPreemption,66 Cornell L Rev 673,681 (1981) (noting that "[p]rotecting the
right of publicity provides incentive for performers to make the economic investments required
to produce performances appealing to the public"); D. Scott Gurney, Note, Celebrities and the
FirstAmendment: BroaderProtectionsAgainst the UnauthorizedPublicationof Photographs,61
Ind L J 697,707 (1986) (arguing that the right of publicity serves to "maximize incentive to develop and maintain skills and talents that society finds appealing").
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ments or careers. In order to encourage continuing achievements in
arts and culture, and to offer an incentive for people to strive to become the next "superstar," the law must ensure that those who invest
time and money in accomplishing great cultural achievements earn a
return on their investment in the form of the benefits of fame that
come with these accomplishments. "
One of the benefits of fame is the value of the celebrity name.
Because society seeks to emulate its celebrities, endorsements are
valuable commodities. If a celebrity persona is used too often, and its
use does not accurately reflect the celebrity's choice, endorsements
lose value because the public cannot distinguish which ones are
genuine. In essence, allowing indiscriminate use of a celebrity name
creates a problem where unauthorized individuals attempt to cash in
on the celebrity's popularity or notoriety. This, in turn, dilutes the
value of the celebrity name for future endorsements."
This dilution rationale supports extension of publicity rights to
domain names: If celebrities are prevented from controlling their
valuable commodities, their names, from being used as domain names,

the value of that commodity is diluted in the physical world. This dilution then reduces the effectiveness of publicity rights, as it eliminates
an incentive for individuals to invest in becoming celebrities.
One could argue that extending publicity rights to domain names
might result in overprotection, since it grants exclusive rights over a
unique piece of Internet "property" to celebrities. However, the fact

43 See note 42.
44 Similarly, the law of trademarks recognizes this potential dilution and has applied it in

the context of domain names. For example, a well known "cyber-pirate," Dennis Toeppen, registered plaintiff's trademark "Panavision" as a domain name, and used his web site to display an
"aerial view of Pana, Illinois" PanavisionInternational,LP v Toeppen, 945 F Supp 1296,1300 (C
D Cal 1996), affd, 141 F3d 1316 (9th Cir 1998). Toeppen demanded $13,000 to give up use of the
domain name. Id. In holding for the plaintiff; the court found that Toeppen diluted Panavision's
trademark (here, its name) by causing confusion as to whether Panavision sponsored or endorsed his web site. Id at 1303-04. See also Toys 'R' Us v Akkaoui, 40 USPQ2d 1836,1837 (N D
Cal 1996) (finding that an Internet site, "Adults R Us," running at "adultsruscom," diluted the
Toys 'R' Us trademarks, tarnishing them by "associating them with a line of sexual products that
are inconsistent with the image Toys 'R' Us has striven to maintain for itself"); Hasbro,Inc v
Internet Entertainment Group,Ltd, 40 USPQ2d 1479,1479 (W D Wash 1996) (granting plaintiff,
owner of children's game "Candyland," an injunction to prevent defendant from operating pornographic web site at "candyland.com;' thereby diluting and tarnishing plaintiff's mark).
Potential dilution in the publicity rights cases seems particularly salient when a celebrity's
name (or a close spelling thereof) is used as a domain name for a pornographic or otherwise image-tarnishing web site. Domain names such as www.SharonStone.com or www.ReneeRusso.com
(extra e added) have been registered and set up as pornographic web sites. Paul Bond, Whose
.com is it Anyway?, The Hollywood Reporter (Oct 8,1999). Many of these sites sell advertising
space in the form of banner ads or receive compensation in other forms, such as a fixed rate per
"hit" on the web site. Allowing such mercenaries to profit from celebrity property interests as
well as mislead consumers would violate the policy concerns underlying publicity rights.
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that domain names create a discrete monopoly"' in cyberspace6 does
not undermine the conclusion that applying publicity rights to domain
names creates the proper incentives. Although the application of publicity rights means that people who share their names with celebrities
may not be able to use their own names as domain names, this fits
with the economic rationale for the publicity rights doctrine, which is
preventing damage to the commercial value of a celebrity's identity."
People who use a well known celebrity name as a domain name will
be unjustly enriched because their web site will receive a lot of attention solely because they share their name with a celebrity. Further4- Only one person can register a domain name. Thus, even though multiple people can
have the same name, only one person can own that domain name. While in trademark law two
people may be allowed to have rights in the same mark as long as they are in different industries
or significantly distant geographic locations, see Beverly W. Pattishall, David Craig Hilliard, and
Joseph Nye Welch II, Trademarks and Unfair Competition, 271-84 (Matthew Bender 3d ed
1998), only one person can have that mark name as a domain name on the Internet. The structure of the Internet therefore creates more of a monopoly than in the trademark statutory
scheme.
46 In order to understand the issues behind domain name disputes, one must first grasp the
basic framework of the domain name system. Every computer connected to the World Wide
Web ("WWW") network has both a domain name and Internet Protocol ("I")that designate a
WWW location analogous to the way addresses and telephone numbers direct us to streets and
homes. The IP is a unique numeric address location that consists of four sets of numbers each between I and 255, separated by periods, which indicate the network, subnetwork, and local computer accessible at that address. Andrew Terrett, A Lawyers Introductionto the Internet, available
online at <http://www.law.ed.ac.uk/it-terrl.htm> (visited Oct 19, 1999); Danielle Weinberg
Swartz, Comment, The Limitations of TrademarkLaw in Addressing Domain Name Disputes,45
UCLA L Rev 1487,1489-90 (1998).
Because IP addresses are difficult to remember and easy to type incorrectly, the domain
name system was established to serve as a more user-friendly equivalent. Swartz, Comment, 45
UCLA L Rev at 1489-90. Domain names, like IP addresses, are also separated by periods to indicate different network levels The "top-level" domain, indicated by the last three letters on the
far right of a domain name, corresponds to either the generic type of organization that registered
the domain name or the geographical region of the organization. Because it was assumed that all
domains would be located in the United States when the World Wide Web was first developed,
the original hierarchy did not have a geographical domain for the United States. Thus, there are
six top4evel generic domain names: .com for company, .org for organization, .gov for government, .net for network organizations, .edu for academic institutions, and .mil for military networks. The top-level domain name generally identifies the type of owner using the address. Id.
Commercial, for-profit organizations, or ".com" organizations, choose their own second-level
designation; domain name owners frequently select trademarks or other well-known names or
phrases to serve as their second-level designation. Id at 1490.
47 McCarthy, The Rights of Publicityand Privacy § 3.1 at 3-3 (cited in note 6).
48 This enrichment is obvious from the number of people who seek to register celebrity
names as domain names. For instance, Rob Moritz of a group called the Friend to Friend Foundation has registered hundreds of domain names that consist of the monikers of famous people.
He claims to be registering the names for the celebrities' protection, to prevent the pornographic
web site scenario, and says he gives the domain names to the celebrities when they ask for them,
hoping only for a donation large enough to cover the cost of the registration. However, Moritz
has his web site configured such that, if one types in a domain name using a celebrity's name who
has not yet claimed his web site, you are transported to Moritz's www.friendtofriend.com web
site, from which he earns revenues through banner and other forms of advertisement. See
Brenda Sandburg, The Name Game:As Fights Increasingly Erupt Over Internet Domain Names
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more, there is less value to ordinary individuals' names because they
are not in the public eye, and people are less likely to search for their
web site by name."
2. Consumer protection rationales for the doctrine.
The right of publicity serves to protect consumers, as well as celebrities. The doctrine is similar in this way to the law of trademark, in
that it seeks to protect consumers from deceptive trade practices and
other market evils.' In this view, publicity rights can be seen as a type
of private regulation of advertising." Because publicity rights law gives
celebrities exclusive control over the use of their name, enforcement
of those rights in the form of lawsuits against unauthorized use of
their names or likenesses protects consumers from false or misleading
endorsements.' In addition, publicity rights law, like trademark law,
"help[s] consumers make rational economic choices" by "promot[ing]
the flow of useful information about commercial goods and services to
the public [there]by ensuring that the public is not confused by a false
implication that a particular celebrity has endorsed a particular
good."'
This rationale maintains its strength despite the fact that consumers may not themselves bring suit. Like the law of trademark, in which
only registered mark holders possess the right of action,0 prohibiting
publicity rights suits by consumers is an efficient mechanism that encourages meritorious suits, as celebrities possess the best incentives to
protect that right, and discourages frivolous suits and an opening of
the "flood gates" to the courthouse.
Broadening the right of publicity to apply to domain names
would promote consumer protection goals, because consumers could
at least be certain that a web site utilizing a celebrity's name as its
domain name was sponsored, endorsed, or otherwise created by that
celebrity. This would reduce some of the vast uncertainty in deter-

Will Lawyers Rake It In? ProbablyNot, 157 NJ L J 1077 (Sept 13,1999). See also note 44.
49 It may be interesting for the reader to note that organizations such as the Screen Actors
Guild, for whose members it may fairly be said that fame is an appropriate goal, maintain as an
objective of the organization the prevention of duplicate name registration. Thus, each working
actor, past, present, and future, is encouraged to register a unique name, building efficiency into a
self-regulatory system. Screen Actors Guild Rules and Regulations § 15 (on file with author).
50 Madow, 81 Cal L Rev at 178-79 (cited in note 13). See, for example, Federal Trademark
Act of 1946 ("Lanham Act") § 43(a), 60 Stat 441, codified at 15 USC § 1125(a)(1) (1994) (creating statutory tort of false representation of goods in commerce).
51 Madow, 81 Cal L Rev at 228 (cited in note 13).
52 Id at 228-29.
53 Douglas G. Baird, Note, Human Cannonballs and the First Amendment: Zacchini v.
Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co.,30 Stan L Rev 1185,1187 n 7 (1978).
54 15 USC § 1114 (1994 & Supp 1998).
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mining the identity of the "speaker" as to at least part of the population of the World Wide Web. This is especially relevant on the Internet, where there is so little guarantee of a speaker's identity. Consumers would also be protected from tricks like being directed to a pornographic web site when trying to access a celebrity's web site. Since the
unauthorized use of a celebrity's name as a web site address would be
prohibited, a celebrity could prevent another party from making such
use of his name.'s
3. Moral rationales for the doctrine.
Finally, there are moral justifications for the doctrine based on
the right of people to "reap the fruits of their labors," or to prevent
the injustice of allowing others to "reap where they have not sown."6
Melville Nimmer argues that someone "who ha[s] long and laboriously nurtured the fruit of publicity values," and invested "time, effort,
skill, and even money" in their development, deserves to enjoy the
benefits himself.5' Indeed, it is almost axiomatic in American culture
that one gets out of something what one puts in; thus any advantage
gained from attaining celebrity status should belong to the celebrity, as
he is the one who has "worked" to realize his position.
This rationale, like the economic and consumer protection arguments, also maintains its strength when offered to justify extending the
right of publicity to the Internet. Since we protect a celebrity's right to
"reap the fruit" of his own labor by allowing him to select whb or what
he endorses in a print, radio or television advertisement, it follows that
we would likewise afford the same protection on the Internet. An
Internet web site is an easy analogy to an advertisement, since many
web sites sell advertising space in the form of banner ads or provide
links to other sites. Often, advertising revenue is determined merely
by the number of "hits" a web site attracts ("web traffic"), regardless
of the length of stay. Thus, a web site operator could register a celebrity's name as its domain name and succeed in attracting a great deal
of web traffic due solely to interest in the celebrity.
Affording a celebrity protection in his name as a domain name
would prevent web site operators from "reaping where they have not
sown": from profiting in advertising revenues or even by merely attracting attention to information on a web site that never would have
been accessed but for the use of the celebrity's name. Even noncommercial uses of the web site would injure the celebrity by preventing
him from enjoying whatever benefit there was from maintaining a
55
56
57

See note 44.
Madow, 81 Cal L Rev at 178 (cited in note 13).
Melville B. Nimmer, The Right of Publicity,19 L & Contemp Probs 203,216 (1954).
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web site. The celebrity would also have the opportunity to use his
name as a domain name and set up whatever form of web site he
chooses to associate with his name, thus allowing him the benefit of
his "labor" as a celebrity. Accordingly, the moral justification, along
with the economic and consumer protection rationales described
above, provides a foundation for courts to extend the right of publicity
to the Internet.
Obstacles to Applying Publicity Rights Law to Domain

B.

Name Disputes
1. Difficulties presented by the architecture of the Internet.
There is an ongoing debate about whether the Internet can be
regulated at all.u much less governed by publicity rights and other preexisting state law. The challenges posed by Internet regulation include:
(a) defining the jurisdictional boundaries of a medium lacking a
physical location, and preventing inconsistent enforcement by multiple regulators, and (b) enforcing remedies against virtually anonymous participants.
a) Jurisdictionalconfusion. Opponents to regulation have said
that cyberspace disrupts geographic boundaries and undermines the
relationship between law and the physical location of the potential offender.59 They argue that the application of geographically based conceptions of legal regulation to activity occurring in the boundariless
nether regions of cyberspace either is illogical or will lead to unresolvable confusion. +
Critics also contend that because transactions on the Internet occur essentially at the same time everywhere, all jurisdictions could simultaneously attempt to govern such activity, leading to redundant or
inconsistent regulation of the same transaction. They argue that the
fluid nature of cyberspace prohibits adequate notice of applicable law,
and further will allow Internet transactions to be designed so that un-

58 For general discussions, see Jack L. Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy,65 U Chi L Rev
1199 (1998) (arguing that regulation of cyberspace is feasible and legitimate but not commenting
on its merits); James Boyle, Foucalt in Cyberspace: Surveillance Sovereignty and HardwiredCensors, 66 U Cin L Rev 177 (1997) (casting doubt upon the regulability of the Internet); David R.
Johnson and David Post, Law and Borders: The Rise of Law in Cyberspace,48 Stan L Rev 1367
(1996) (discussing the challenges that the Internet presents to current legal doctrines); Dan L.
Burk, Federalismin Cyberspace,28 Conn L Rev 1095 (1996) (discussing the problems of multijurisdictional regulation on the Internet).
59 See, for example, Johnson and Post, 48 Stan L Rev at 1374-77 (cited in note 58).
60
61

Id.

Id at 1370-73.
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desirable regulation can be evaded, making such laws seem illegitimate.Q
Allowing publicity rights law to govern domain name usage also
raises the practical question of whether these rights are limited to the
familiar ".com" domain names6 3 or whether the law would apply to
other top-level domain names. There are a large number of countryspecific top-level domain names in addition to the familiar U.S.-based
top-level domain names. If publicity rights were applied to all toplevel domain names internationally, the potential for international legal conflict could arise. On the other hand, if the application were limited in some way, the value of a celebrity's right could be diminished
by inconsistent enforcement arising from courts applying different
laws and from different levels of protection being afforded depending
on the particular top-level domain name.
b) Unenforceable remedies. Remedies are also particularly difficult to enforce in an intangible forum like the Internet. First it is hard
to know against whom to enforce a right, given the ease with which
anonymity or impersonation can be achieved in cyberspace. And even
if defendants could be identified, the low cost of entry into a medium
like the Internet greatly increases the probability that they will be
judgment-proof In addition, injunctions might prove to be particularly
challenging to impose. The components required to maintain a web
site are so easily moved that potential defendants have the ability to
literally vanish into thin air and to continue their infringing ways.
2. Problems with applying state law to the Internet.
Beyond the threshold questions of whether regulation is possible,
applying pre-existing state laws of publicity rights to the Internet
raises questions involving conflicts of law and forum shopping.
a) Choice-of-law uncertainty. Publicity rights do not exist in all
states, and where they do exist, their content is not uniform. Thus,
courts facing publicity rights suits must determine what law should
govern the suit. Choice-of-law rules in most states dictate that courts
must apply the law of the state with the most interestin the litigation.0
Most courts follow the Restatement (Second) test or Brainerd Currie's interest analysis in determining choice-of-law issues.4 Essentially
Id at 1375.
63 See note 46 for a definition of domain names.
64 Other possibilities include .org, .net, or a variety of international top-level domain
names. See note 46.
65 See, for example, Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws (1971)
66 See Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 6 (1971); Brainerd Currie, Notes on
Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws, 1959 Duke L J 171, 178, reprinted in Brainerd
Currie, Selected Essays on the Conflict of Laws 177, 183-84 (Duke 1963). See also Jeffrey M.
62
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these approaches look to several factors in considering which state's
substantive law to apply. These analyses aim to determine which states
have a significant enough interest to deem their law applicable, using
factors such as domicile of the parties, citizenship, place of infringement, protection of justified expectations, and certainty, predictability,
and uniformity of result.n
The Internet, however, is not easily understood in terms of physical boundaries. A web site is maintained physically by a server which
in turn obtains access to the World Wide Web via an Internet Service
Provider ("ISP"). These may be located in different states from each
other and from the persons accessing the web site. Thus, even more
confusing questions arise over which law is the correct law to apply. Is
it the law of the state in which the person who owns the domain name
is domiciled? The state in which the server is maintained? The state
where the ISP does business? Traditional choice-of-law analysis with
consideration of factors like place of infringement does not easily lend
itself to application on the Internet.
There are very few cases that apply choice-of-law analysis to the
Internet. Furthermore, most cases that do engage in choice-of-law
analysis ignore the difficulties in a true interest analysis involving the
Internet, instead opting for more categorical rules adopted directly
from the physical world. For instance, in Hitchcock v Woodside Literary Agency,6 the district court, applying New York choice-of-law rules,
failed to consider how defamation on the Internet might change
choice-of-law analysis. The court claimed to apply the law of the place
where the plaintiff's injuries occurred, assuming that because the
plaintiff lived in and accessed the Internet in Maryland, that is where
the harm occurred.6 '9 This analysis, however, ignores the complexity of
the issue. Because the Internet can be accessed anywhere in the
United States, reputational harms may have occurred in many other
states,' leaving the question of where the injury actually occurred
much less clear than the court suggested.
Shaman, The Vicissitudes of Choice of Law: The Restatement (First, Second) and Interest Analysis, 45 Buff L Rev 329 (1997) (arguing that interest analysis is the best way to make choice-of-law
decisions); Bruce Posnak, Choice of Law-Interest Analysis: They Still Don't Get It,40 Wayne L
Rev 1121 (1994) (explaining what interest analysis is and stating that its critics often misunderstand the concept); Alfred Hill, The JudicialFunction in Choice of Law, 85 Colum L Rev 1585
(1985) (discussing the revolution of choice-of-law rules and why precedent should be followed in
this area).
67 Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 6 and accompanying comments; Currie,
1959 Duke LJ at 178 (cited in note 66).
68 15 F Supp 2d 246 (E D NY 1998) (dismissing plaintiffs New York common law defamation claims for harmful speech that was disseminated via the Internet after finding, without discussion, that plaintiff's injuries occurred in Maryland, where she was domiciled).
69 Id at 251-52.
70 See Isuzu Motors Ltd v Consumers Union of United States, 12 F Supp 2d 1035, 1044 (C
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Because a court must consider many factors when determining
which state is most interested, in any given case many states' laws
could apply.' Often judges find it difficult to know which state is most
interested, and the initial task of determining which law to apply can
overwhelm a court and destroy judicial economy. 7As a consequence,
similar claims may be treated in different ways depending on the forum's choice-of-law analysis.
b) Forum shopping. Applying publicity rights law that is individually codified by state to domain name disputes likely will create
incentives for forum shopping, a situation that could potentially eviscerate the effectiveness of various state laws. The Internet could prove
to be a veritable mecca for forum shopping, as a party would be able
to pick and choose whatever state law he liked the best. Access to a

web site in a given jurisdiction may establish the minimum contacts
necessary to apply that state's substantive law to the underlying case, 73
because the flexibility typically available in minimum contacts analysis
allows the requisite state interest to be established under a low
threshold.74 Although choice-of-law rules will also affect the ability to
forum shop, as noted, uncertain choice-of-law analysis in the Internet
context can be manipulated to allow a state to apply its own law.75
Further, in many jurisdictions, limits on the exercise of personal
jurisdiction will not prevent forum shopping. Although personal jurisdiction limitations usually act as a check on unrestrained forum shopping, courts have found that the accessibility of a web site in a state
provides the minimum contacts necessary to establish personal jurisdiction. 6 This principle is not universal; some courts require that web
D Cal 1998) (noting that damage to reputation is an injury resulting from defamation).
71 For a general discussion, see Larry Kramer, InterestAnalysis and the Presumptionof Forn Law, 56 U Chi L Rev 1301 (1989).
72 See Zeran v America Online, Inc, 958 F Supp 1124,1129 n 7 (E D Va 1997) (noting the
failure of the parties to raise the difficult choice-of-law issue of "which state's tort law is applicable to an alleged injury caused by an anonymous posting of a bogus message on an interactive
computer system operated by a corporation residing in Virginia where the notice is available for
review by online subscribers internationally and results in harm to a plaintiff in Washington").
73 Access to a web site in a jurisdiction may satisfy the low minimum contacts standard required for due process limits on choice of law. Compare Home InsuranceCo v Dick,281 US 397
(1930) (describing the due process limits on choice of law).
74 See Keeton v HustlerMagazine Inc, 131 NH 6,549 A2d 1187,1188,1196 (1988) (holding
that state had sufficient interest in suit to apply its law, despite blatant forum shopping and limited distribution of defendant's magazine). Regarding state interests, see Restatement (Second)
of Conflict of Laws § 6; Currie, 1959 Duke L J at 178 (cited in note 66).
75 See Part II.B.2.a.
76 See, for example, Compuserve, Inc v Patterson,89 F3d 1257,1263 (6th Cir 1996) (finding
that distributing software on a web site through an ISP based in the forum state was a sufficient
basis for jurisdiction); NationalFootball League v Miller, 2000 US Dist LEXIS 3929, *6 (S D NY
2000) (holding that jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant did not violate due process when
the defendant's web site damaged the plaintiff and generated substantial profits in the forum
state); Stomp, Inc v Neato, LLC, 61 F Supp 2d 1074,1078 (C D Cal 1999) (finding that marketing
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sites engage in active solicitation " in order to constitute purposeful
availment of the state's benefits.8 For states that do recognize personal
jurisdiction through web site access, the due process limitation on personal jurisdiction is rendered virtually meaningless. This could lead to
people being haled into court in virtually any state at the whim of others.
III. COURTS SHOULD APPLY PUBLICITY RIGHTS LAW TO DOMAIN
NAME DISPUTES
As publicity rights law has developed in various media to protect
and preserve the integrity and economic value of celebrity names, it
should now be applied to a new medium: domain names. Currently,
the domain disputes that have been adjudicated deal with registered
marks (for example, www.yourtrademark.com) and utilize trademark
law.7 Domain name disputes that involve celebrity names, not registered marks, are relatively new phenomena to United States courts.
Since these disputes are not governed by trademark law, celebrities
need to find some other source of protection for their names. Expanding the scope of publicity rights to include the Internet would be
the most logical and judicially practicable solution.
Characteristics peculiar to the structure of the domain name system and publicity rights law remove the obstacles inherent in regulating a boundariless medium like the Internet]8 Domain names, unlike other areas of the Internet, are particularly well suited for regulation, as illustrated by the cases already applying trademark law to domain name disputes. Moreover, the nature of publicity rights law itself
makes it particularly well suited to regulating celebrity domain name
disputes because publicity rights law provides clear limitations about

through a web site constitutes sufficient minimum contacts to warrant exercise of personal jurisdiction in suit challenging validity of patent); Heroes Inc v Heroes Foundation,958 F Supp 1, 3
(D DC 1996) (holding that knowingly advertising on a web site and receiving publicity and contributions subjects one to jurisdiction).
77 See, for example, Maritz, Inc v Cybergold, Inc, 947 F Supp 1328, 1334 (E D Mo 1996)
(finding that a web site's infringement on a trademark is a basis for jurisdiction in the state given
active solicitation of citizens in that state); Bensusan Restaurant Corp v King,937 F Supp 295,301
(S D NY 1996) (holding that simply creating a web site that can be accessed in New York, without actively soliciting in New York, does not subject defendant to personal jurisdiction in New
York); McDonough v Fallon McElligott, Inc, 40 USPQ2d 1826,1830 (S D Cal 1996) (finding that
a web site must be "specifically directed" towards the forum state in order to subject the site
owner to personal jurisdiction).
78 Purposeful availment of a state's benefits fulfills the due process limitation on personal
jurisdiction. Hanson v Denckla,357 US 235,253 (1958). See also InternationalShoe v Washington, 326 US 310 (1945) (holding that systematic and continuous contact with the state was sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction).
79 For discussion of how trademark law is applied, see note 83 and accompanying text.
8o See Part ll.B.
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who may exercise the right, and celebrities make up a small proportion of Internet users. This Part first demonstrates by analogy to
trademark law how domain name disputes on the Internet can be
regulated; then it addresses the choice-of-law and forum shopping issues, where the analogy is inapt because publicity rights law does not
exist in a uniform federal scheme like trademark law.
A. Analogizing Domain Name Disputes to Trademark Disputes
Demonstrates that Domain Names Can Be Regulated
The architecture of the domain name system has been designed
such that every domain name is globally unique. One acquires the
right to use a particular domain name by registering that name with
an authorized administrator of the central database of names, such as
Network Solutions, Inc. ("NSI"), and paying the initial registration fee
and subsequent renewal fees, which are typically biannual. Once a
domain name has been registered, it is unavailable for use by any
other party in the world. When a party attempting to register a name
discovers that it is already in use, and he believes that for some reason
he has a superior right to use that domain name, he can initiate legal
action against the party who registered the domain name.
Domain name disputes can and have been regulated by trademark law.8' The fact that trademark law mandates an affirmative duty
to register in order to attain rights in a mark limits who has rights to
use a trademark as a domain name." This registration requirement is
analogous to the strict restrictions in publicity rights law on the type
of name that merits protection. By looking at cases involving trademark disputes, the difficiilties of jurisdictional confusion, inconsistent
regulation, and absence of remedies may appear more easily resolved
in the context of publicity rights on the Internet than first anticipated.

81 See note 83. For a more extensive discussion, see Swartz, Comment, 45 UCLA L Rev at
1487 (cited in note 46) (analyzing the application of trademark law to domain name disputes and
concluding that a new cause of action should be created to deal with the problem); Ira Nathenson, Comment, Showdown at the DomainName Corra" PropertyRights and PersonalJurisdiction
over Squatters; Poachers and Other Parasites,58 U Pitt L Rev 911, 989 (1997) (concluding that
"[t]he Lanham Act provides a good, [but] flawed, analytical framework for settling domain name
disputes"). See also Marguerite S. Dougherty, Note, The Lanham Act Keeping Pace With Technology, 7 J L & Pol 455 (1999) (arguing that Congress should "provide for nationwide jurisdiction in trademark controversies [that are] derived from electronic contacts on the Internet").
82 Depending upon geographic distance and differentiation in industry, multiple parties
may own rights in the same mark, so that there is not necessarily a monopoly in a particular
mark. However, registration of a mark is limited by the overriding concern for preventing consumer confusion. A mark may not be registered by multiple parties if there is a likelihood that
consumers would be confused as to the product's origin. 15 USC § 1052 (1994 & Supp 1998).
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1. Avoiding inconsistent regulation.
Despite the concerns raised above regarding the jurisdictional
confusion caused by regulating the Internet, trademark law has been
successfully utilized to adjudicate a number of domain name disputes
involving marks. Courts apply the same analysis developed in nonInternet trademark cases to Internet domain name disputes involving
registered marks, thus providing precedent for extending an existing
intellectual property right onto the Internet. Most claims for trademark infringement in domain name controversies arise in cases in
which domain name owners incorporate the trademark holder's exact
mark, or an extremely close version of the mark, into a domain name.
Extending publicity rights to domain names would simply provide celebrities with a right to a similar claim. Thus, domain name cases under
trademark law are indicative of the types of cases that will arise if
publicity rights law is extended to the Internet and demonstrate that
regulating the Internet is not impossible.
This is so because domain names are very similar to trademarks
on the Internet. Like the monopoly that trademark holders enjoy, domain name owners possess discrete monopolies. Regardless of the
number of mark holders or celebrity rights claimants, for better or
worse, the architecture of the World Wide Web dictates that only one
person can claim a monopoly over a particular domain name. Even in
trademark law, where two people can own rights in the same mark, as
long as they are in different industries or significantly distant geographic locations, only one person can have that mark name as a do83 Two primary types of cases arise under trademark law as applied to Internet domain
name disputes: "domain name grabbing" and "reverse hijacking" cases. Domain name grabbing
cases involve individuals known as "cyber-squatters" or "parasites" who strategically register
trademarks as domain names either to sell them to the federally registered trademark holders or
to keep the domain names from the trademark owners. In reverse highjacking cases, domain
name registrants may unknowingly register another's trademark or may themselves have legitimate rights in the trademark, but the actual trademark holder seeks to "reverse hijack" in order
to gain control over the use of the domain name through NSI or the courts. See note 44 for a description of recent "domain name grabbing" cases, in which plaintiffs routinely triumph in suits
against cyber-squatters. Precedent also sways in favor of the trademark plaintiff in reverse hijacking cases. See, for example, Cardservice International,Inc v McGee, 950 F Supp 737,740-41
(E D Va 1997) (ordering defendant to relinquish "cardservice.com" web site used to market
credit and debit card processing services due to likely confusion with plaintiff's identical services
sold under the registered mark "Cardservice International"); Planned ParenthoodFederationof
America, Inc v Bucci, 42 USPQ2d 1430 (S D NY 1997) (holding for plaintiff where defendant
registered domain name "plannedparenthood.com" to identify a web site promoting an antiabortion book). See also ActMedia, Inc v Active Media International,Inc, 1996 US Dist LEXIS
20814, *3 (N D 1ll) (finding defendant's use of domain name "actmedia.com" precluded plaintiff
from reserving the domain name incorporating its registered mark and therefore violated 15
USC § 1125 (1994)). For a general discussion, see Dougherty, Note, 7 J L & Pol 455 (cited in note
81); Swartz, Comment, 45 UCLA L Rev 1487 (cited in note 46); Nathenson, Comment, 58 U Pitt
L Rev 911 (cited in note 81).
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main name on the Internet. Thus, the party with rights to the mark
trumps a party without rights, and the first party with rights to register
the domain name attains monopoly rights over that domain name.84
Similarly in publicity rights, although there is no formal registration, a
celebrity's rights in his name may trump an ordinary person's rights,
even if they share identical names. This is true even if the ordinary
person was not using the web site for any commercial gain because
preventing the celebrity from using his name deprives him of a valuable commodity, and, though it may be an unintentional effect, may
dilute the celebrity's name, damaging its commercial value." In the
unlikely event that two celebrities share the same name, the first celebrity to register that domain name would trump."
2. Enforcing remedies.
Finally, unlike other aspects of the Internet, the nature of the domain name system is well suited to enforcing legal remedies, particularly with regard to those available under publicity rights law. The
domain name system requires every web site operator to register and
pay a fee in order to attain a specific domain name. Potential defendants are therefore easily identified. In addition, a renewal fee must
be paid typically every two years. Thus, rights to a domain name resemble a landlord/tenant relationship, where the landlord retains significant control over his property. Infringement of a celebrity's publicity rights caused by the use of a particular domain name can be remedied easily by taking away the infringer's rights to that domain name
and allowing the celebrity to take control of the web site name. A domain name, as a piece of property, could be seized in an in rem action
in those cases where the party that registered the domain name can-

See notes 45 and 83.
See McCarthy, The Rights ofPublicity and Privacy § 3.1 at 3-3 (cited in note 6).
86 Even though attaining control of a domain name does confer a worldwide monopoly, the
application of publicity rights law to domain names can be fashioned to avoid impinging upon
the laws of other nations. Although domain names exist internationally, the top-level domain
name does provide a way to differentiate by country, such as .uk for the United Kingdom, .ger
for Germany, and so forth. The application of publicity rights law could be restricted to familiar
US. domain names-those that are available for public use, .com, .org, and .net-thus cabining
complete international application. Because country-specific top-level domain names are significantly less familiar to the American public than U.S.-specific ones such as .com or .org, the threat
of dilution or unjust enrichment from such foreign use is not as great in the United States, and
activity abroad is not a primary concern of US. courts.
This scheme would sufficiently protect a celebrity's value in his name, as it appropriately
balances preventing the dilution of a celebrity's name against extending state law into an international forum. Furthermore, the simple fact that U.S. courts would be unable to provide absolute protection from all infringement does not mean that the courts should not uphold state
publicity rights laws and afford celebrities the best possible protection within the realn of U.S.
top-level domain names.
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not be located. This simple scheme of enforcement provides further
support for the application of publicity rights law to celebrity domain
name disputes.
Conflict of Laws and Forum Shopping as a Vehicle for the
Application of Uniform Publicity Rights to Domain Names

B.

Because publicity rights law is state law, its application to domain
name disputes is considerably more complicated than that of trademark law. The application of publicity rights law must overcome the
conflict of laws and forum shopping problems detailed above.n In this
respect, trademark law is not an apt analogy because it is federal law,
and therefore these problems do not arise.
1. Choice-of-law determinations.
Choice-of-law determinations are challenging because they are
complex and expend judicial resources. The first step in analyzing a
publicity rights claim in a domain name dispute is determining the
state law that applies. Specific choice-of-law rules depend upon the
state in which the lawsuit is filed. Factors normally taken into account
in publicity rights disputes such as domicile and state interest, among
others, are still cognizable." Because of the boundariless quality of the
Internet, the location of infringement does become less straightforward in the analysis. But as long as courts establish clear criteria to
consider when analyzing choice-of-law questions pertaining to the
Internet, applying publicity rights law to domain name disputes remains theoretically feasible. In actual application, choice-of-law principles, especially with regard to the Internet, are generally flexible
enough to allow states that already have jurisdiction to apply their
own law, and most states prefer to do so.9 Thus, a party could affect
the choice of law by choosing to sue in a certain jurisdiction, as the
likelihood is that the forum will apply its own law.
Although courts are nominally limited by Due Process and Full
Faith and Credit considerations in choice-of-law decisions, in reality
these considerations place few limits on courts' choices.9 As a consequence, so long as there is some interest for a state to apply its laws,
See Part II.B.2.
See Goldsmith, 65 U Chi L Rev at 1232-37 (cited in note 58) (arguing that choice-of-law
problems in cyberspace are not very different from those in the physical world context).
89 See Kramer, 56 U Chi L Rev 1301 (cited in note 71). See also Rosenthal v Fonda, 862
F2d 1398, 1402 (9th Cir 1988) ("As the forum, a California court will conclude that a conflict is
'false' and apply its own law unless the application of the foreign law will 'significantly advance
the interests of the foreign state:") (citation omitted).
90 See Keeton v Hustler,131 NH 6,549 A2d 1187,1196 (1988). See also text accompanying
note 74.
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the Constitution places no further limits. Applying this analysis to the
Internet publicity rights context, most fora will have no constitutional
problem applying their own law. Furthermore, choice-of-law principles
suggest that every state has an interest in the litigation, because web
sites are accessible from every state. Even if neither party is domiciled
in the state, the state has an interest in protecting its consumers from
misleading web sites.' Thus, a state can also claim itself as the place of
injury, a cognizable factor in choice-of-law analysis, where dilution
constitutes the harm. Even if the celebrity plaintiff is not domiciled in
a particular state, the value of his name can still be damaged wherever
his reputation exists. Given the preference of most state courts for applying their own law,9 and the fact that they have a cognizable interest
in the litigation, in the Internet context, a forum can apply its own law.
2. The benefit of forum shopping.
Similarly, forum shopping does not necessarily present an insurmountable obstacle. In fact, in the case of applying publicity rights to
domain name disputes, forum shopping would likely effectuate a
beneficial result-uniform national law. Publicity rights disputes, more
than other types of claims, are particularly predisposed to such an outcome. Plaintiffs seeking to enforce their publicity rights in these disputes would, by definition, be celebrities. Since celebrities tend to have
a great deal of resources at their disposal, these plaintiffs would have
the ability to forum shop by suing in states providing the most protection for their persona, hoping that the forum state would choose to
apply its own law. This push to apply the most favorable law could
create a de facto national law as applied to the Internet, resulting in
uniform adjudication of celebrity domain name disputes.
Although this essentially eviscerates individual state publicity
rights law with respect to domain names, it solves the problem of notice by creating a uniform national standard. While some might argue
that this is an impermissible interference with state sovereignty, states
that have not chosen to protect celebrities will not have their courts
commandeered; celebrities will be forced to enforce their rights in
states that do provide protection. Also, since the web is accessible in
every state at once, and regulation of the web affects every jurisdiction's access to the web's content, the web is necessarily suited to uniform regulation and uniquely removed from the justifications for preserving state sovereignty.
Furthermore, in order to achieve the efficient level of protection
of the publicity rights of celebrities, state law should not create exter91 This assumes that a state enacts laws to protect its citizens.
92 See text accompanying notes 88-91.
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nalities that allow citizens of a state to reap benefits at the expense of
celebrities in other states, or vice versa. For example, states without a
significant number of celebrities are unlikely to enact legislation or
recognize a common law right that protects celebrities' rights over the
rights of their own citizens. These states, however, also benefit from
celebrities who bring publicity rights actions to protect the use of their
name, because citizens of those states enjoy the cultural benefits such
as films and sports events that those celebrities create. Thus, applying
publicity rights to domain names and allowing celebrities to forum
shop is a way to provide regulation with appropriate incentives.4 In
addition, one of the primary goals of the choice-of-law doctrine is to
promote uniformity, and this result achieves that goal.
CONCLUSION

Publicity rights law should offer the same protection in cyberspace that it affords in tangible space. The border-transcending nature
of the Internet and its fluid form require publicity rights law that will
likewise transcend boundaries. Recognizing a right of publicity as applied to domain names would provide that necessary protection, and
create consistency and certainty in the law.

93 Note that those states that have not enacted publicity rights legislation or recognized a
common law right of publicity are not known for generating a large number of celebrities, while
the first states with publicity rights protections were California and New York-states populated
by many celebrities. See notes 3,8-13 and accompanying text.
94 It could be argued that allowing celebrities to forum shop will lead to excessively procelebrity publicity rights law, because some states with a lot of celebrities will have laws that excessively protect the interests of their celebrity-citizens at the expense of non-celebrities in other
states. However, if celebrities are allowed to forum shop, they need not reside in those states in
order to gain the benefits of their favorable publicity rights laws. Thus, states with inefficient procelebrity laws will bear the costs of the litigation attracted to their courts without guaranteeing
that celebrities will reside within their borders.
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